New England Dam Reports

With all the talk of drought, I thought that I should start a regular series of New England dam reports. You can find the original source data here. The percentages that follow may not be exactly correct since they come from graphs. I have drawn supporting information especially from sweetwater fishing.

Toonumbar Dam was built across Iron Pot Creek 31km west of Kyogle and completer in 1972. It holds 11 000 mega-litres of water and has a surface area of around 400 hectares when full. It is currently around 90 per cent full.

Pindari Dam is located on the Severn River 63 kms from Inverell, 22 kms upstream from Ashford. Pindari comes from an aboriginal word meaning 'high rocks' and is the name of an early pastoral run which adjoined the dam. Construction of Pindari began in 1967 with completion in 1969. Key facts:

• Storage capacity - 312,000 million litres or over half the volume of Sydney Harbour.
• Catchment area - 1,994 square kilometres.
• Surface area - 10.5 square kilometres.
• Maximum spillway discharge - 21,900 cubic metres/second (1.89 million ML/day).
• Maximum outlet discharge - 58 cubic metres/second (5,000 ML/day).

Pindari is currently around 35 per cent full, with a recent increase in water levels.

Copeton Dam is located approx 30km south west of Inverell. The dam is almost three times the size of Sydney Harbour when full and was built across built across the Gwydir River in 1976. I have started a series on the Gwydir River Valley.

In recent weeks dam levels have increased slightly to around 13 per cent.

Split Rock Dam lies on the Manilla River, a tributary of the Namoi, 31k from Barraba and 15 k from Manilla and was constructed in 1987 for irrigation. It has a water storage capacity of 397,370 mega-litres, a surface area of 2150 hectares and a maximum depth of 60 meters.

Split Rock has been flatlining at around 3 per cent full.

Lake Keepit lies on the Namoi River 13km upstream from the junction with the Peel River. The Dam was constructed in 1961 and has a storage capacity of 425 000 mega-litres when full.

In recent weeks, dam levels have increased from around 6 to 14 per cent.

Chaffey Dam lies on the Peel River on the edge of The Fossickers Way, 16km to the north of Nundle and 44Km south of Tamworth. The Dam has a capacity of 62,000 mega-litres and is the main water supply for Tamworth. Over the last few months, storage has increased from around 14 to 44 per cent.

Lake Glenbawn lies on the Hunter River around 15 kilometres east of Scone. Construction of the Glenbawn Dam was finished 1958, with a major upgrade in 1986. The Dam now holds 750 000 mega-litres at full supply capacity.

Since May, dam levels have increased from around 28 to 38 per cent.

Glennies Creek Dam lies 25 km north of Singleton and has a storage capacity of 283,000 million litres. Since May capacity levels have risen from around 25 to 35 per cent.

Lostock Dam was built across the Paterson River in 1971 for irrigation and town water storage and has a capacity of 20,230 mega-litres. The dam is currently full.

Bellingen - what was the flood of 1870?

Photo: the Bellinger River at peace.

Looking at searches that had led people to this blog, my curiosity was caught by one search "1870 flood in bellingen".

Flood are not uncommon in Bellingen since the town is bisected by the Bellinger River. This rises in the escarpment to the west of the town around Dorrigo, one of the wettest places in Australia.

I remember one time when staying at Sawtell on the coast north-east of Bellingen, a cyclone dumped 24 inches in 21 hours on Dorrigo, creating a vast flood that stretched across the lower Bellinger Valley blocking all north-south and east-west access for a number of days.

So given that floods are not uncommon, what was it about the flood of 1870 that made it significant? This took me on a web tour trying to find out.

My starting point was the 2001 Bellingen CBD master plan. This reminded me that Bellingen was originally known as Boat Harbour as the head of navigation on the Bellinger River. By the 1930s, the river was no longer navigable as far as Bellingen. However, a reminder of the town's shipping past is provided by the three masted topsail schooner, The Alma Doepel. Launched in 1903, this is now a popular tourist attraction at Port Macquarie.

The plan appears to contain one reference to 1870, a simple statement that by 1870 all the cedar trees that had lined the river has been cut out.

My next port of call struck pay dirt. This was the SES Bellingen flood safe guide. From this we learn that November 1870 was indeed the largest flood since records began, topping out at 11.55 metres.

This would indeed have been a huge flood. In the main town, the river is constrained within a relatively narrow channel with 10 metre high banks. So the 1870 flood would have topped those banks by over a metre and a half.

New England's Wild Weather

Photo: Sydney Morning Herald. The bulk carrier Pasha Bulker forced aground on Newcastle's Nobby Beach. Story.

On the morning of Friday 8 June, Tamworth's Northern Daily Leader reported on a discussion that if no water flowed into Chaffey Dam, Tamworth's businesses would be forced to close in nine month's time. The Chaffey Dam, Tamworth's main water supply, lies on the Peel River whose headwaters are a short distance away in the south-western edge of the New England Tablelands around Nundle (and here).

Later that day, a low pressure cell off Newcastle unleashed cyclonic conditions and torrential rain on Southern New England.

Conditions since can best be described as chaotic.

Heavy rain led to flooding. High winds created chaos during which the Pasha Bulker was driven ashore on Nobbys Beach. Two other bulk carriers just escaped. In all, an interesting experience after drought.

Whether this storm will be sufficient to solve Tamworth's water supply problems is unclear. Rainfall data is not yet available and in any event follow up rain will be required. Still, signs are now encouraging that the drought that has gripped the western side of New England is coming to an end.

Postscript 16 June

I did not write a full post on the impact of the wild weather on the Lower Hunter itself because it was so fully covered elsewhere. I was surprised, however, at the scale of the damage.

Major Hunter floods are not uncommon. Yes, this was the biggest downpour for thirty or so years, but even so. I was left wondering about changes in the human especially built landscape over the last thirty years, including things such as changes in the electricity distribution system.

Was it just a case of localisation, very bad weather in a narrowly defined location, or did changes in settlement patterns contribute to the scale of damage?

Returning to Tamworth, I see from the Northern Daily Leader that the weekend rain nudged Chaffey Dam's storage up from 13.9 per cent to 14.9 per cent.

Chaffey Dam's storage level had reached an all-time low of 13.9 per cent last week – prior to 2015, the lowest previous level was 19 per cent in 1995.

The dam's volume has not reached 100 per cent since 2002. When it does reach full capacity, water covers an area of 542 hectares and can reach a depth of about 30 metres. It now sits at about six metres at its deepest point.

The Clarence River and the Great Big Water Grab 2 - the issues

Photo: Clarence River near Ulmarra

In my last post I spoke of Mr Turnbull's grab for the waters of the Clarence River to provide water to the people of Brisbane and South East Queensland. In this post I want to spell out the issues as I see them as simply and as clearly as I can.

Any proposal of this type will generate opposition as well as a range of responses, especially from those with environmental concerns. These are important issues that need to be addressed. But I think that there is a broader set of principles involved.

As a statement of general principle, most if not all Government decisions over resources create a pattern of winners and losers.

In the case of the Big River, the immediate losers are the people of the Northern Tablelands and the Northern Rivers who lose access to a resource, the winners are the people of Brisbane and SE Queensland who gain water.

There are direct and indirect or longer term losses associated with the Clarence proposal. Direct losses include the potential affect on the livelihood of those who depend upon the river. Indirect losses include the opportunity costs associated with loss of alternative uses of the water.

There are no benefits that I can see for the people of New England to offset these losses. All benefits flow to the people of Brisbane and SE Queensland. To add salt to the wound, to the degree that the Turnbull proposal involves tax payer money, then the people of New England will in fact be subsidising Brisbane.

This leads me to my first conclusion. If the dam is to proceed, the people using the water should pay the full cost of the water including any direct losses plus opportunity costs, the people of New England should be compensated for those losses and costs.

Two issues then arise. How do we place a value on the losses and opportunity costs? What mechanism might be used to distribute the payment for the losses and opportunity costs?

These are not easy questions to answer to begin with, with the difficulties increased by the absence of any form of New England Government.

To illustrate this last point, consider the difficulties facing the NSW Government in responding to this issue.

The NSW Government does not recognise the New England I am talking about as an entity in any sense what so ever. This makes it hard for it to deal with the issue.

The Iemma Government faces a second problem in that adoption of the approach I am talking about would in fact seriously constrain the future freedom of the NSW Government to do as it wills. Here we have already seen in the case of the proposed Tillegra dam that Sydney itself is quite prepared to play water politics, to override local interests, to gain immediate political advantage.

In all these circumstances, I think that the most that we can expect from the NSW Government is a political response determined by its judgement about the various political forces involved.

This leads me to my second conclusion. If we cannot rely on either the Federal Government or State Government to recognise, let alone respect, the New England interest, then it is up to the people of New England to discuss and present issues in a way that forces consideration of the New England interest. The starting point here needs to be a revived conversation about possible uses of the waters of the Clarence.

I say conversation because I do not think that there is any present agreement even on the issues themselves. I may be wrong, but I have the strong impression that the water grab took people by surprise even though it has been clear for some time that water politics would lead to such moves.

In the meantime, political forces are likely to stall the dam in the short term.

The Federal ALP has attacked the dam, while the Federal National Party itself is vulnerable in some New England electorates. However, the issue will not go away. For that reason, I think it important that the conversation be pursued.

The Clarence River and the great big water grab.

Map: Clarence River Valley

I am of course sorry that SE Queensland is suffering from water shortages. But if they want water, they can bloody well get it from elsewhere.

The point? The Federal Government says that Brisbane should solve its water problems via a dam on the Clarence River. This is a big New England River that rises in the New England Tablelands. It is totally within New England.

Leave aside environmental considerations. If Brisbane is to get water from a New England river then they should pay full price so that money can be used to build New England.

If this happens then there is at least a payback. But at this point there is no suggestion that there will be any payment.

Newcastle, the Lower Hunter & the Tillegra Dam

When I first heard that the NSW Government proposed to build a major dam in the Lower Hunter to meet the water needs of the Lower Hunter and the Central Coast I assumed that Newcastle and the Lower Hunter had a serious water problem, so I took it all on face value.

Today's Sydney Morning Herald carried a story suggesting in fact that the Lower Hunter did not have a problem, that Hunter Water had said previously that the dam was not needed in the immediate future. So now I was curious.

I went to the Hunter Water web site. Here I found that there were no water restrictions, that restrictions did not come into force until water storage reached 60 per cent as compared to a current level of 82.5 per cent. I also found that the main dams were over 90 per cent full.

So why, then, was the dam to be built? Here the site carries the official story. I must say that I found this unconvincing. Yes, the Central Coast has a problem. Why, then, are Hunter consumers being asked to pay a cost? I was left with the uncomfortable conclusion that the announcement was in fact a stunt to take attention away from the Milton Orkopoulos affair.

More on Armidale Hail

Just another striking photo on yesterday's Armidale hail storm, this one from the photoblog of Bronwyn Clarke.

Armidale's Hail Storms

Photo: Armidale after the storm, nineMSN.

Yesterday, 23 December 2006, a major hail storm hit the eastern edge of Armidale, the University city in the centre of New England's Northern Tablelands.

The twenty minute storm left a trail of destruction in its wake, with homes unroofed, windows smashed, cars damaged, trees stripped of foliage and glass from broken windows strewn about the streets.

Around 1,000 homes as well as other property including the local exhibition centre were damaged. The city has been declared a natural disaster area.

Photo: Gordon Smith, Armidale Exhibition Centre after the storm.

Hail storms are a relatively common feature of Tabeland's weather. Usually they do little damage. However, this is the second if somewhat smaller major storm to hit Armidale in the last ten years.

The story that follows is largely drawn from Peter Burr's story on Australia's severe weather. I have put in the link here, although I notice that there are problems in accessing it. I appear to be drawing from a cache copy.

On the afternoon of 29 September 1996 most Armidale residents were in doors, many watching the Rugby League grand final.

A storm had been building to the south west. By lunch time the sky became darker with storm clouds building to the sound of distant rumbling thunder. Just before 2pm an initial storm arrived with rain and small hailstones - around 10 millimetres diameter. The rain stopped at 2.30pm but intermittent thunder continued.

While no Armidale residents knew it, there had been no storm warning, a huge cumulonimbus storm cloud or a supercell had been building.

Inside this cloud massive updraughts were sweeping tiny particles of dust and ice up into the higher reaches where supercooled droplets of water were waiting to freeze onto them upon impact creating small hailstones. These hailstones were then falling to the lower levels before again being caught in the updraughts.

At 3pm this supercell approached the city from the south-west - a dark menacing cloud with an unusual colour described by many said later as orange or pink. The thunder increased and light rain started falling.

At 3.23pm the first of the hailstones fell on the city. At this stage the stones were 10 to 20 mm in diameter. They fell for about two minutes, then stopped briefly.

A roaring sound was then heard from the south-west. Unfortunately for Armidale, after making many trips up and down the hailstones circulating in the giant cloud had become bigger than golf balls and, too heavy to remain aloft, had started plummetting to the ground.

The huge hailstones made a deafening sound on roofs, and as they hit roads and hard surfaces they bounced several metres back into the sky. The wind started gusting from the south-west which was devastating for thousands of south and west facing windows - the sound of breaking glass accompanied the roaring of the hail. At 3.30pm it was all over.

The city had been extremely unlucky. Thunder storms are not unusual - the city averages 56 such storms annually - but severe hail is unusual. In this case, nearly all the major hail was dropped directly on the city itself.

The damage was astonishing. Eighty per cent of city buildings had been damaged, many severely, while some 3,000 cars received hail damage, creating a damage bill of over $A200 million, making it in insurance terms the third largest disaster in Australia's history.

In the longer term the effects were not all bad. The need to repair the damage created a building boom that lasted several years, leaving the city (always attractive) with a refurbished feel.

Photo: Gordon Smith, after the storm. This photo shows the scene in Armidale after the last storm as the combination of warm ground with the cold air and water creates mist. As Gordon notes, the scene now looks very pretty and peaceful, but the mist hides the storm damage.

Life in the Macleay Valley - setting the scene

Having just come back from South West Rocks, this is the first of a series of short posts on the Macleay Valley.

They will be drawn especially from Marie H Neil's book, Valley of the Macleay. The History of Kempsey and the Macleay River District (Wentworth books, Sydney 1972), a book that I have to return to the South West Rocks library in the not too distant future.

Just to set the scene for those who do not know the Valley, it is long, narrow and relatively small, 11,241 square kilometers (4,340 square miles).

In the west, the Macleay River has its source along the eastern edge of the Northern Tablelands from Walcha to just north of Armidale, making for a reasonably large catchment area. In the south, the Valley is separated from the Hastings Valley by the Hastings Range, in the north from the Nambucca Valley by the Snowy Mountain Range.

In the east, the River flows out to the sea at South West Rocks, wandering through a 647 square kilometer (250 square mile) deltaic plane created by the River over thousands of years.

The Macleay Valley is an attractive place. The backing mountain ranges to the south, north and especially the east with peaks as high as 5,000 feet provide an attractive backdrop, while the Valley itself packs a variety of scenery into its small area.

The total population of the Valley (I do not have the most recent figures) is around 28,000, of which some 11,000 live in Kempsey, the biggest centre and the Valley's commercial hub.

There are a number of seaside villages on the coast of which South West Rocks (population now around 5,000) is the largest. The resident population of these, while still relatively small, has grown reasonably significantly over recent years.

Between Kempsey and the sea there are a number of smaller agricultural villages on the delta. This, in combination with the farms, makes for a varied human landscape.

The Upper Macleay is very different. Here grazing is the main activity in the generally narrow winding valley with small rural service centres at Willawarrin and Bellbrook.

Pilliga Fires

I had decided not to make any posts while I was on holidays, but coming back to New England has generated so many story ideas.

One of my favourite books was Eric Rolls' A Million Wild Acres, the story of the area known as the Pilliga Scrub.

I wonder how many Australians realise that the Australia seen by the first Europeans was a man modified landscape? Our aboriginal ancestors did not just sit lightly on the landscape leaving it unchanged, they modified it to better suit their way of life.

Fire was a key tool. Fire could be used to help drive animals to waiting hunters. Fire was also used to encourage green pick (the fresh shoots that emerged after the blaze) to attract kangaroos.

In turn, the Europeans changed the landscape by reducing the incidence of fire. At the start of the twentieth century Mr Maiden, the NSW Government botanist, reported on the way that thick vegetation had appeared in the Snowy Mountains following the cessation of regular burning by the Aborigines.

In New England, botanists at the University of New England suggested that the open wooded appearance of the Western slopes had been created through fire because this created the optimum food collection environment. There was better grazing, while the grass provided seed for flour.

Roll's book recorded what happened in the Pilliga area once Aboriginal influence was removed. Absence of fire together with flooding rains in the 1880s triggered a major germination of native cypress and eucalypts, replacing the previous open wooded area with a thick forest/scrub. Forestry then became a major local industry based on the newly created forests.

Given that this was a new forest area, I was surprised at the progressive moves from 1967 to turn the Pilliga into national parks instead of the previous dual use. This culminated in the 200 decision by the NSW Carr Government to lock up 348,000 hectares of the Brigalow Belt South Bioregion in "community conservation areas." This included Tinkrameanah State Forest which became a national park.

The Government's move reflected pressures from environmental groups including the Western Conservation Alliance and was opposed by local grazing and timber interests. The timber industry in particular - a major local employer - was left in a much diminished position limited to a relatively small number of areas still open to logging.

The recent Pilliga fires that burnt out more than 120,000 hectares of land including the Tinkrameanah National Park as well as half the land remaining for logging and threatened local towns has reignited controversy.

Locals argue that the intensity of the fire was directly related to the decision to transfer land to National Parks. They also argued that in this case - a new forest - logging and forestry management was required to maintain biodiversity.

In response, John Dengate, the Public Relations Director for for the National Parks and Wildlife Service, argued that the Service had maintained fire management practices holding under the Forestry regime. He also argued that history showed that a major fire occurred every decade irrespective of how much hazard reduction burning was done or who was in charge.

Mr Dengate's statement about the regularity of fires appears to be correct. There have been major fires in 1966 (100,000 hectares). 1974 (40,000 hectares), 1979 (75,000 hectares), 1982 (120,000 hectares) and 1997 (140,000 hectares).

But while this is correct, it seems to me to miss the point. Of itself, the replacement of the previous open woodland country with thick bush would definitionally lead to more fires given the Australian environment. The key issue as I see it is the impact of reduced logging on fire intensity combined with the transformation to national parks. I would have thought that this must definitionally increase fires even if at the margin.

Mr Dengate's comment also does not address the claims made by locals that the creation of the Parks is reducing, not increasing, biodiversity.

I have no expertise in this area. But looking at local claims, there would appear to be at least two arguments that can be tested.

The first is that the change from a logging system to national parks of itself reduced biodiversity.

The second is that the build-up of fuel associated with reduced logging increased the intensity of the fire, thus degrading the environment.

I am left wondering whether we are dealing with another case of decisions imposed from outside in opposition to local interests and knowledge.