Abstract:
In recent years, there has been national alarm about the rising rate of home foreclosures, which now strike one in every 92 households in America and which contribute to even broader macroeconomic effects. The "standard account" of home foreclosure attributes this spike to loose lending practices, irresponsible borrowers, a flat real estate market, and rising interest rates. Based on our study of homeowners going through foreclosures in four states, we find that the standard account fails to represent the facts and thus makes a poor guide for policy. In contrast, we find that half of all foreclosures have medical causes, and we estimate that medical crises put 1.5 million Americans in jeopardy of losing their homes last year.
Half of all respondents (49%) indicated that their foreclosure was caused in part by a medical problem, including illness or injuries (32%), unmanageable medical bills (23%), lost work due to a medical problem (27%), or caring for sick family members (14%). We also examined objective indicia of medical disruptions in the previous two years, including those respondents paying more than $2,000 of medical bills out of pocket (37%), those losing two or more weeks of work because of injury or illness (30%), those currently disabled and unable to work (8%), and those who used their home equity to pay medical bills (13%). Altogether, seven in ten respondents (69%) reported at least one of these factors.
If these findings can be replicated in more comprehensive studies, they will suggest critical policy reforms. We lay out one approach, focusing on an insurance-model, which would help homeowners bridge temporary gaps caused by medical crises. We also present a legal proposal for staying foreclosure proceedings during verifiable medical crises, as a way to protect homeowners and to minimize the negative externalities of foreclosure.
Wednesday, December 30, 2015
Illness and Foreclosure (h/t Vanessa Perry)
Christopher T. Robertson , Richard Egelhof, and Michael Hoke have a paper:
Links to Cousins!
My counsin Jon's site:
http://www20.kellogg.northwestern.edu/facdir/facpage.asp?sid=1299
My cousin Scott's site:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=scott+rifkin+ph.d.+yale&btnG=Google+Search
If other cousins have sites, I will link to them too.
http://www20.kellogg.northwestern.edu/facdir/facpage.asp?sid=1299
My cousin Scott's site:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=scott+rifkin+ph.d.+yale&btnG=Google+Search
If other cousins have sites, I will link to them too.
About today's awful Case-Shiller number
A month ago, David Stiff of Fiserve informed me, "in general, sales of bank-owned (REO) properties are included in the repeat sales pairs used to estimate the indexes if they occur at least 6 months after a previous arms-length transaction."
There are currently markets in which foreclosure sales make up 40 to 50 percent of all sales. These transactions are almost surely not representative of the housing stock, and so the CSI is currently a biased estimate of house price changes. I admire both Case and Shiller a lot, but they really need to fix this.
There are currently markets in which foreclosure sales make up 40 to 50 percent of all sales. These transactions are almost surely not representative of the housing stock, and so the CSI is currently a biased estimate of house price changes. I admire both Case and Shiller a lot, but they really need to fix this.
Did California Overbuild its Housing Stock?
It all depends on the relevant time frame. If we look at the 00's in isolation, California overbuilt.
But California has grew by 7 million people between 1990 and 2015 and added about 2.43 million housing units (all data are from US Census-- assume that 98 percent of units permitted are actually built). The average household in California has 2.9 people (which is the second highest in the country, and compares with 2.5 nationally), which means that even without removals from the stock and no change in household size, the state needed 2.41 million new housing units. So if we look at the 18 year horizon, California did not overbuild--there we almost surely more than 20,000 demolitions over an 18 year period.
What if we go back to 1980? California grew by 13 million people and added 4.4 million housing units. At 2.91 people per unit, California demanded 4.46 million units. Again, it is safe to assume 60,000 demolitions over 28 years, so it is hard to make a case for long-run overbuilding.
Certainly, some housing was built in the wrong places, or was the wrong type of housing for the place (Lancaster and Beaumont come to mind). But it is hard to make a case that in aggregate California now has too many housing units.
But California has grew by 7 million people between 1990 and 2015 and added about 2.43 million housing units (all data are from US Census-- assume that 98 percent of units permitted are actually built). The average household in California has 2.9 people (which is the second highest in the country, and compares with 2.5 nationally), which means that even without removals from the stock and no change in household size, the state needed 2.41 million new housing units. So if we look at the 18 year horizon, California did not overbuild--there we almost surely more than 20,000 demolitions over an 18 year period.
What if we go back to 1980? California grew by 13 million people and added 4.4 million housing units. At 2.91 people per unit, California demanded 4.46 million units. Again, it is safe to assume 60,000 demolitions over 28 years, so it is hard to make a case for long-run overbuilding.
Certainly, some housing was built in the wrong places, or was the wrong type of housing for the place (Lancaster and Beaumont come to mind). But it is hard to make a case that in aggregate California now has too many housing units.
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